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Political Religion in Twentieth-Century China and Its Global Dimension

Thoralf Klein
There are different ways of conceptualizing the relationship between religion and politics in twentieth-century China. One is to examine the religious policies of the state or political organizations. In this case, the political and the religious are treated as more or less autonomous spheres. 1 Another is to look at the overlap between the two, in particular at the ways that politics became 'religionized.' This approach has evolved into a burgeoning field of research over the past two decades, with studies coming under different labels such as 'political ritual,' 'political (or personality) cult' or 'political religion.' 2 Of these, 'political religion' goes furthest in undermining the binary conceptualization of religion and its 'other' as diametrically opposed categories. 'religious' field," which they argue was to a considerable extent a political project. 5 While it makes sense to conceptualize the emerging forms of mass politics, authoritarianism and totalitarianism as new "affective regimes" 6 competing with the established ones of religion, this alone is not sufficient.
For it glosses over the stunning parallels between totalizing ideologies and religion, notwithstanding the fact that the former--in an irony of dialectics--were often adamantly anti-religious. 7 The concept of political religion can help clarify how the modernizing state as well as modern political organizations not only impacted on the religious field, but how their prescriptive ideologies also became part of that field and must therefore be studied as religious phenomena in their own right.
This is not to say that political religion is the same thing as religion proper. Indeed, this is a matter of debate amongst proponents of the concept, with some scholars using the religious 1 terminology only metaphorically or by way of analogy, while others argue that political ideologies constitute a new form of religiosity based on modern manifestations of the sacred. 8 The German-born political scientist Eric Voegelin (1901 Voegelin ( -1985 , one of the founding fathers of the concept, holds that the state is not simply a secular institution and that some of its features must be defined as religious.
Tracing the development of political religion from antiquity to Communism and Fascism in the 1930s, Voegelin regards modern political religions as strictly inner-worldly, which distinguishes them from at the 'trans-worldly' redemptive religions (though not necessarily from non-redemptive religions).
Political religions are thus at the same time a product of secularization and an attempt to overcome it.
9
Following the dissolution of the Christian ecclesia, they seek to create a perfect inner-worldly community by offering a renewal that Voegelin calls "apocalyptic," by which term he refers to a perceived need to overcome the forces of evil (be they the bourgeoisie, supposedly inferior races or others) as a prerequisite to attaining social redemption.
10
This apocalyptic dimension is equivalent to what students of Fascism have called 'palingenesis': the notion of a (national) rebirth from a state of crisis, which derives from Christian soteriology, but can likewise be applied to matters secular. 11 It is important to note, however, that this utopian dimension of political religion, which promises the creation of an idealized community through an epic struggle, is not incompatible with claims to scientific rationality. In fact, as Voegelin has argued, such modern "apocalyptic revelations" often pretend to be scientific, while in his view they are in fact "myths" relying on the emotional mobilization of the masses. 12 Such mobilization is achieved through the focus on a political leader, who takes the place of the godhead, through the persuasive deployment of rituals and symbols, through expressions of faith in the leader and his teaching and finally through the dissemination of a new revolutionary morality that includes selfexamination and, if necessary, self-sacrifice. 13 It is obvious that while some of the above elements were not unknown in pre-modern China, others--in particular a faith-based rhetoric and a Christianity-based soteriological concept--were 8 unfamiliar in a country where the focus traditionally was not on believing, but on 'doing' religion.
14 Political religion in China is thus not only a modern concept, it is also bound up with processes of globalization.
In this essay, I shall examine the global dimension of political religions in China, applying a longitudinal section through the twentieth century. I will embed the phases that can be most easily identified as having been politically religious--the rule of the National Party or Guomindang (GMD, 1925 (GMD, -1949 and that of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the leadership of Mao )--within the broader intellectual and political trends as well as their global connotations. My argument is that firstly, the emergence of political religion in China can be interpreted as a constitutive element of a double globalizing process: directly through Moscow's strategy of Communist world revolution and both directly and indirectly through the global spread of Christianity--it must be borne in mind that the Soviet sacralization of the political, as exemplified in the cult of Lenin, owed a great deal to the Christian religion. 15 Despite being an emulation of Soviet beliefs and practices, the cult of Sun Yatsen (usually referred to in Chinese as Sun Zhongshan , 1866 -1925 , my first major case study, was part of a global wave of totalitarian movements and regimes sharing features of political religion. But secondly, this was not a one-way process. 
Zedong
Global Factors in the Emergence of Political Religion in China
The socio-political transformation of China at the turn of the twentieth century conformed to a long-term global trend identified by the sociologist Reinhard Bendix (1916 Bendix ( -1991 15 See Ryklin (2008) . 16 For the term 'global moment' see Conrad and Sachsenmaier (2007), pp. 12-16. 17 Bendix (1980) , pp. 4-10. Note that the word 'global' is not part of Bendix's vocabulary (a search engine yields only one hit), but he uses the roughly equivalent term 'universal' repeatedly throughout the volume.
public and hence with an eye to public reactions that are likely to follow." 18 In China, the gradual shift towards constitutional monarchy after 1901 and, more importantly, the abrupt demise of the Qing dynasty in 1911/12 left a vacuum that was waiting to be filled with new concepts able to achieve domestic stability and international equality for a country still attempting to extricate itself from the fetters of imperialism.
As a result, the connection between religion and politics that had been the bedrock of late Imperial China underwent a major shift. Up until the late nineteenth century, the emperor was the head and high priest of state religion, with officials on each rung of the bureaucratic ladder acting as lesser priests by making regular sacrifices to specific deities. 19 Although its purpose was the maintenance of order and stability in the empire, it clearly involved a transcendent dimension that consisted in what the anthropologist Jordan Paper, pointing to a common theme underlying the generally pluralistic and heterogeneous religious landscape in China, has identified as the ritual core of Chinese religion(s): the exchange of sacrifices for protection. 20 Hence it can be classified as innerworldly, but not as redemptive. When the Qing dynasty embarked on a constitutional programme in the last decade of its rule, it attempted to back this up by elevating the sacrifices for Confucius, who was to become the centrepiece of a dynastic patriotism. What is important here is not so much that this attempt at rallying the population behind the dynasty fell short of its objective. Rather, it is that although the elevation of the great sage marked a rupture with the established order of state religion, geared towards the emerging concepts of nationalism and citizenship, 21 it derived from a timehonoured precedent and did not focus -as political religions would later do -on a contemporary leader.
However, the same global intellectual, cultural and social currents that the Qing dynasty sought to address through innovative forms of worship, pulled China into a different direction altogether. Modern politico-scientific concepts such as (social) Darwinism, liberalism, nationalism and communism began to be received by China's emerging intelligentsia through the translations of Fu (1853-1921) and others. 22 This was part of a wider transformation: the creation of a modern political, social and scientific language, based first on missionary translations and since about 1895--the year of Qing China's crushing defeat at the hands of Japan--on the indirect adoption of 18 Ibid., p. 8.
Yan
19 Feuchtwang (1978) , especially pp. 106-07. For the sake of simplicity, I will not engage here in a discussion about the term 'religion' in China, nor about the concern for orthodoxy and the religious policy of the Ming and Qing dynasties.
20 Paper (1995), pp. 26, 47 . For the concept of religious landscape and its plurality, see Goossaert and Palmer (2011) . Accordingly, the nation was the first inner-worldly political object to become sacralized.
Early nationalism also revealed the apocalyptical dimension of a secular ideology for the first time in
Chinese politics, as the existence of the Chinese nation had to be defended not only against imperialism, but also against the Manchu Qing dynasty. For example, in his Wangguo pian (Essay on the downfall of the nation), published in 1904/05, Chen Duxiu (1879 Duxiu ( -1942 juxtaposes the traditional change of an Imperial dynasty to the downfall of the Chinese nation-state.
According to him, China "already counts as a perishing country in the world" because its territory, economic rights and sovereignty had been seized by foreigners. 26 For Chen, territory in particular is "the first important thing for a state… Today, no nation-state in the world, can cede an inch of its sacred and inviolable territory to other people."
27
With its borrowing of religious language, its rhetoric of apocalypse and palingenesis and its culture of practical activism, early Chinese nationalism bears some similarities to later, full-fledged forms of political religion. Where it differs--and what disqualifies it as a political religion in the strict sense of the term--is its lack of focus of worship, organizational structure and clearly articulated faith. From the late Qing through the early Republic, nationalism was ideologically heterogeneous and structurally dispersed, despite the impressive mass demonstrations between 1905 and the mid-1920s 23 For this shift see Elman (2005) , especially p. 395; for the wider context also the contributions in Lackner and Vittinghoff (2004) .
24 Rankin (2002), p. 339; Cohen (2003) . 25 See, among others, Rankin (2002), pp. 335-38; Lee (2009); Zhou Yongming (2006) , Gerth (1998 The alliance between the GMD and the Soviet Union/Comintern was not free of tensions, as Sun Yatsen insisted on putting the National Party on an independent footing. Nevertheless, the Comintern representatives in China made fundamental contributions to the reconstruction of the party:
They made Sun and the GMD aware of the value of centralized propaganda work. 35 They reorganized the party into a hierarchical apparatus based on the principle of democratic centralism. They created a new type of army that was under party control, heavily ideologized and active in propaganda work.
36
And in so doing, they provided the context for Sun's reformulating his ideology, the Three People's Principles (Sanminzhuyi ), in a series of lectures which for all their lack of coherence were his most systematic attempt at creating a political platform. These reflected themselves a mixture of 33 Leng and Palmer (1976) , p. 76.
34 Kuo Heng-yü et al. (1996) , pp. 27-52; Pantsov (2002), pp. 33-36; Riegel (1999) 39 In the following years it began to permeate the GMD texts; for example, the Three People's Principles are occasionally referred to as a "Gospel" (fuyin ) in which people "believed"
(xin ), the latter term being ubiquitous; party members and adherents of the Nationalists called themselves "adherents" or "disciples" (xintu , an explicitly Christian term) of Sun's doctrine.
40
The National Revolution of 1925-1928 which gave the Guomindang nominal control over (almost) the entire Chinese territory, a mixture of military campaigns and the largest mass movement
China had seen to date, bore out this pattern. Public agitation was directed at warlords and foreign imperialists (including Christian missionaries); the latter were not only vilified, but sometimes demonized outright, although the GMD leadership and its Soviet allies may have sought to curb excesses so as not to precipitate a conflict with the Western powers. 41 Sun Yat-sen's untimely death in
March 1925 prevented him to witness this; even as the National Revolution was still ongoing, the GMD began to use his ritualized memory as the focal point that would enhance the legitimacy of the new regime.
There is no indication that the Comintern advisers directly influenced the emergence of the personality cult around Sun, although the Soviet Union contributed to it by calling its newly established training institute for GMD and CCP cadres in Moscow Sun Yatsen University. Between 1925 and 1928 (two years before it was eventually closed), the University produced around 600 graduates, with both parties accounting for roughly half of them each. 42 In all probability, however, the construction of Sun Yatsen as a symbol of the new regime began as an attempt by the GMD to tap into spontaneous commemorative activities springing up locally in the wake of the leader's death.
Such activities probably drew on Sun's positive image with the Chinese public; he had been respected 37 For a more detailed analysis, see Wells (2001) Riegel (1999), pp. 339-40; Sheng Yueh (1971) , p. 41.
as one of very few incorrupt politicians. 43 Before long, however, the GMD took control and established a host of activities, some of them one-off events, others permanent and some regular: A lavish memorial service for Sun was held after his death. Four years later, his remains were transported in state and with large crowds turning up along the railway tracks from Beijing to his chosen resting place at Nanjing . There, his remains were transferred in solemn procession to a grandiose mausoleum at Purple Mountain (Zijinshan ), which was reminiscent both of the Hongwu Emperor of the Ming Dynasty (ruled 1368-1398), whose tomb is nearby, and--in conscious emulation--of Lenin. 44 In Guangzhou, a large memorial hall was erected in commemoration of Sun; all over China, streets and urban districts, parks, schools and academic institutions, were named after him, as was his birthplace, the district and town of Xiangshan , which now became Zhongshan . In 1927 and 1930 respectively, the anniversaries of Sun's birth and death joined the calendar of Nationalist holidays, while two other important holidays--10
October as the anniversary of the 1911 revolution and Gregorian New Year as the founding date of the Republic--largely centred on Sun's image as well as his ideology. That dates prior to 1912 were converted from the old lunisolar calendar to the Gregorian one indicates that the commemoration of Sun was bound up with the GMD's attempts at making China part of global modernity. 45 Finally, honorific titles were bestowed on Sun. In the years following his death, he was referred to as the zongli or Premier--a title he had assumed in 1924 and which also refers to heads of government--until in 1940, he was canonized as the 'Father of the Nation' (guofu ).
46
Amongst these varied activities, the Weekly Remembrance of the Party held a special place, partly because of its weekly rhythm and partly owing to the concentration of symbols. It was to be held every Monday morning in all party branches, government offices, army units, schools and universities. It was thus not a mass ritual, despite being transmitted to a wider public by intensive press coverage, radio broadcasts and through 'enlarged' (kuoda ) ceremonies directed at mass audiences of several thousand people. 47 The ritual came in a number of simple steps: 48 At the beginning, the assembly would rise (or stand, if there were no seats available) in a respectful attitude. To what extent the cult of Sun Yatsen was able to penetrate and transform society is a matter of debate. The Weekly Remembrance, whose target group could be expected to have been loyal followers, gave grounds for many complaints. In particular, commentators bemoaned that despite the penalties with which absentees were threatened, attendance at the ritual was still poor. It seems, however, that violations were not systematically penalized. 57 On the other hand, after the GMD had regrouped on Taiwan in 1949 it continued to practice the Weekly Remembrance as an attempt at its largely successful political consolidation.
58
In a global perspective, the Weekly Remembrance and other elements of the GMD's political religion were the result of a global revolutionary project and an ensuing cultural transfer. The GMD no doubt was aware that the Chinese National Revolution was connected with revolutions elsewhere in the world. 59 Clearly it was not a latecomer-- 
The Mao Cult as a Global Moment, 1960s and 1970s
Like its predecessor, the Sun Yat-sen cult, the personality cult of Mao Zedong had its roots in Your achievements are higher than the sky.
Your loving kindness is deeper than the sea.
The sun in my heart will never set.
Your heart will forever be close to ours. doctrine on contradictions.
68
What is more interesting in the context of this article is that the Cultural Revolution should not be viewed in isolation. Rather, it formed part of a global wave of social upheavals and transformations that shook both the 'developed' nations of Europe and North America, the struggling nation-states of Latin America and the freshly decolonized Third World. 69 The domestic causes of this upheaval were always complex and varied from country to country and from world region to world region. They were held together, however, by the common framework of the Cold War, which was compounded by the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, and the changes to the system of nation-states brought about by decolonization, both transformations that were changing the face of the globe. Gonzalez, *1934), who became known to his followers as puka inti, Quechua for "Red Sun," while some nicknamed him more disrespectfully "shampoo," for his alleged ability at brainwashing people. 85 The Shining Path also followed the Chinese example by making use of big-character posters of sorts and even reciting CCP songs in Mandarin.
86
In the West European student movement too, adaptations of Maoist ideas and paraphernalia also gave rise to notions of palingenetic renewal. Writing in retrospect, the former German activist Gerd Koenen (*1944) almost echoes Eric Voegelin when he speaks of "a certain apocalyptic 80 Wenner (2000), p. 111; cf. Collins (2012) , p. 10.
81 Sumanta Banerjee as quoted in Chakrabarti (1990), pp. 59-60. 82 Quoted in Singh (1995): 70. 83 For the "squads" see ibid., 70-71; for the 'red book marriages ' Roy 2012, 108-09 and 112-13. 84 Cf. Paul (2013), 1-8; Chakravarti (2008) .
85 Gorriti (1992) , p. 151.
86 Cook (2010), pp. 304-05. thinking" exhibited by the movement. China, Koenen goes on to argue, made it possible for German youths to radically reinvent themselves, challenging the older war generation and escaping from the seemingly inexorable rift imposed by the logic of the Cold War. Maoism perfectly fit the idea that somehow there existed a link between third-world liberation movements and the students' attempts at reinventing and refashioning their own society. 87 Echoing another icon of CCP history, student leader
Rudi Dutschke (1940 Dutschke ( -1979 called in February 1968 for a "long march through institutions" that would lead to the creation of counter-institutions or "liberated zones" within bourgeois society.
Although at surface level, Dutschke refers to Maoism as a pragmatic strategy, his ideas of antibourgeois forms of social life also appears to foreshadow a complete renewal of society. It is quite possible that related experiments with communal forms of living also had their roots in the study of Chinese Communist texts.
88
Thus China became a blueprint for radical attempts at renovating society--apocalyptic in that they could only fully be realized through the overthrow of the existing social order. At the same time,
China was itself a utopia concretized, as one widely read book argued--a place where human beings and their needs were at the centre of politics and administration.
89 Surprisingly, this utopia appealed not only to the New Left, but also to conservatives such as the former French minister of education Alain Peyrefitte , the German journalist Klaus Mehnert 89 Kuntze (1975) , p. 206.
90 Rudolph (1989); cf. Apter (2005) . 91 Wemheuer (2008), p. 19.
religious allusion was used to express disappointment at the Chinese leader's retreat from his revolutionary line. When following the death of Mao, the PRC abandoned his radical policies and walked down the capitalist road that Mao had so fervently spoken out against, China ceased to be viewed as the paradise of the workers and peasants that could serve as a model for a radical and miraculous restructuring of 'Western' societies.
As the global moment to which the Mao cult had so greatly contributed gradually petered out across the globe, it also did so in China--with some qualifications, however. Mao was not completely 
Vestiges of Political Religion in the Post-Mao Era, 1976-present
Despite this enduring popularity of certain aspects of the Mao cult in the years after his death, the leadership of party and state quickly embarked on a different course. Its attempts to humanize political power holders was summed up succinctly by then head of state Ye Jianying (1897 -1986 in his speech on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the People's Republic in October 1979:
According to Lenin, those who lead a proletarian party and a Communist state usually are not individuals, but a collective composed of several people referred to as leaders. Organizations at all levels need their leaders… Leading personalities are not gods, they cannot but have defects and [commit] mistakes, [hence] they should not be deified.
93
As well as distancing themselves from the Mao cult, the new leaders also sought to undermine its ideological underpinnings. For Deng Xiaoping (1904 Xiaoping ( -1997 , the emerging paramount leader, the core of the Mao Zedong ideas consisted not in the concept of class struggle, but in 'seeking truth from facts' (shishi qiu shi ). In establishing practice as the sole criterion of truth, Deng was supported by Hu Yaobang , who until his dismissal as Secretary 92 Barmé (1996) ; Wagner (1992 a). 93 Ye Jianying (1979) , p. 26.
General of the CCP in 1987 was one of his closest political associates. Deng and his followers succeeded in establishing a discursive framework that forced party cadres to declare themselves in favour of the new political line of the party, no matter whether they were convinced of it or not. 94 This shift paved the way for China's new economic policy; at the same time, it was a major departure from the emphasis on individual faith and inner transformation characteristic of the Mao era. Propagating the 'liberation of thought' (jiefang sixiang ), the CCP under Deng had effectively been stripped off all signs of political religion.
The approach of the early Deng Xiaoping years was not to last, however. 
95
In reaction to the two democracy movements, which it suppressed ruthlessly, the CCP tried to redefine both its ideology and its position within the world at large. The Four Basic Principles, laid down in 1979, contained those features that the party was determined to hold on to: MarxismLeninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the leadership of the CCP, Socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The formulation, however, was vague and more geared towards preventing the people from challenging the party-state. 96 In 1992, three years after the brutal crackdown on the demonstrators at Tian'anmen Square, the CCP officially adopted Deng Xiaoping theory, which included as developmental goal a "socialism with Chinese characteristics" (you Zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi ). This formula pointed to a specific Chinese goal of modernization that would resemble neither Soviet-style socialism nor the liberal-democratic capitalism of the West. The deliberate camouflaging of the 'Western' origins of socialism was an echo of the late-nineteenth century ti-yong formula, conceived by Confucian scholars in an attempt to strengthen China by importing 'Western' technology while at the same keeping 'Western'
94 For this shift see Zhang Wei-Wei (1996) , pp. 23-28. 95 Wagner ( truly global player.
In the post-Mao era, the CCP has replaced the 'faith' in the political leadership that was such a defining feature of Mao's rule with a more empirically oriented and increasingly technocratic understanding of politics. The party has promulgated a new code of social ethics aiming at the creation of social harmony through correct practice--a strategy that, it is true, borrows heavily from Confucianism and is more in line with Chinese modes of 'doing religion' than with the faith-based understanding of religion adopted from the 'West.' 110 The same can be said of the (propagandistic) attempts of creating a middle-class society, which is both a realistic strategy and draws on Confucianinspired utopianism. At the same time, the Party has sanitized its own history and sacralized that of China at large. This can be viewed as a response to the domestic and international challenges in a rapidly globalizing world. While it echoes some of the defining features of political religion -in particular the immaculate image of the Party and its leadership, the symbolism surrounding the nation and the notion that China must overcome contending forces to attain its rightful place in the world -, it bears more resemblance to the pre-1920 period than to Guomindang China or the Mao era.
Conclusion
The trajectory of political religion in twentieth-century China owes much to China's standing in the world at large. It grew out of attempts at overcoming China's perceived international weakness, which was always bound up with the country's domestic problems. At the same time, it can be viewed as a specifically Chinese response to one of the great global challenges of the twentieth century: the decline of a transcendent legitimacy of political authority. In the 1920s, China became part of a global revolutionary project that sought to unite the oppressed peoples of the world under the leadership of the Soviet Union against capitalist imperialism. Although this project was soon abandoned by the Soviet leadership itself, it had a lasting impact on Chinese politics. The Nationalists, who had severed their ties with Soviet Communism as early as the late 1920s, adapted the Soviet model of political religion and mixed it with Christian influences, despite explicitly disavowing the latter. For the Guomindang, faith in the late leader Sun Yatsen and in the party ideology he created was essential in bringing about a domestically unified and internationally strengthened China. Political rituals centred around the memory of Sun and geared towards creating a revolutionary work ethic became the means to inculcate this faith amongst the political and social elites, whose successful mobilization would enable China to become part of a global modernity. However, this also required struggles to overcome obstacles and foes in order to win through to the ultimate goal--a vision which constitutes the 'apocalyptic' element of the GMD's political religion.
In principle, the political religion of the CCP propagated throughout the Mao era stemmed 110 Chau (2011), p. 549. from the same ideological background and served the same goals. But not only did they penetrate more deeply and more effectively into Chinese society, they also became part of a global moment in the 1960s and 1970s. This united different constituencies--a youthful urban counterculture in the 'West,' revolutionary guerrilla movements in the Third World. While for the latter, adopting Mao's strategies seemed to reflect a straightforward logic, this was not the case for the former. In Western Europe and North America, an increasing receptivity towards the emerging Third World played a far greater role. The politically religious dimension Maoism could inscribe itself into this trend. But this process was not exclusively determined by the receiving end: China's essential contribution to the revolutionary global moment consisted in producing powerful symbols--most notably Mao's portrait and the Little Red Book as well as other Mao writings--that had an appeal for different constituencies.
As political religions, the ideologies of the GMD and of the CCP in the Mao era shared a number of characteristics: Both placed a strong emphasis on faith and invididual as well as collective transformation, based on the cult of a political leader. In abandoning these, the post-Mao Communist leadership took an altogether different approach. However, the global environment within which it operated looked more akin to the situation of Guomindang China than to the global moment of the 1960s and 1970s. Although many emerging economies could look to the Chinese developmental model for guidance and 'Western' enterprises could not resist the allure of the Chinese market, CCP ideology was hardly a selling point. 'Western' public opinion in particular, having somewhat belatedly discovered the atrocities during Mao's reign, was increasingly hostile, pointing to China's human rights violations as well as its increasing military build-up and heightened nationalism. In this context, vestiges of political religion continue to exist in the form of a whitewashed party history, the sacralization of national history, the apocalyptic identification of enemies and obstacles to be overcome, the propagation of a moral code that can unify the population domestically and strengthen China vis-à-vis the challenges from abroad and finally the vision of a harmonious future society and a rise of China's power at the global level.
With the possible exception of the democratic movement of 1989, the Mao cult ceased to be Mao's successors has sought to make his imprint on the ideological development and--more broadly speaking--the political culture of party, state and society. And for Xi, elements of Maoist politics may appear as an expedient tool to distinguish himself from his predecessors and establish his authority as a leader. All of this clearly does not imply a return to the class struggle of the Mao era.
But it indicates how elements of political religion inherited from the twentieth century may still shape China's contemporary politics. What is also obvious is that in shaping its political culture, present-day
China can rely on a purely national heritage. The global processes by which the idea of political ideologies as beliefs was introduced in China as well as the ideas of apocalypse and palingenesis that the Mao cult radiated back into the wider world now appear to belong to history.
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